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THE FALSE PROMISE OF PUBLICLY
OFFERED PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
Manning Gilbert Warren III*
INTRODUCTION
HREE years ago Congress radically altered the Securities Act of
19331 (1933 Act), which for some eighty years had required the
registration of all public offerings of securities. 2 In its enactment of
Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 3 (JOBS Act), Con-
gress ordered the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to expand
its Rule 5064 private placement exemption to exempt from registration all
public offerings of securities that are sold only to accredited investors.5
This necessitated an amendment to the statutory private placement ex-
emption at Section 4(a)(2)6 of the 1933 Act, which the Supreme Court
long ago held inapplicable to offerings made to the general public or to
even a single offeree who does not have access to the type of information
registration would provide.7 The SEC in adopting the original Rule 506
* H. Edward Harter Chair of Commercial Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law,
University of Louisville. The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of his ad-
ministrative assistant, Janet Gribbins Sullivan, and his research assistant, Emily E. Meyer,
in the final preparation of this article.
1. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et
seq. (2012)) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
2. 1933 Act § 5 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e) ("It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to ... offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to
such security .... ")
3. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter JOBS Act]. See generally
Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Role of the States in the Regulation of Private Placements,
102 Ky. L.J. 971, 971-73 (2014) [hereinafter Warren, Role of the States].
4. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
5. JOBS Act § 201(a)(1) (mandating that the SEC revise its rules "to provide that the
prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising ... shall not apply to offers
and sales of securities made pursuant to section 230.506, provided that all purchasers of
securities are accredited investors"). An "accredited investor" means: (a) certain banks,
brokers or dealers, insurance companies, investment companies, or private business devel-
opment companies; (b) an organization or trust with greater than $5,000,000 in assets that
was not formed for the purpose of acquiring securities; (c) the issuer's director, officer, or
partner; (d) an individual with a net worth in excess of $1,000,000; (e) an individual with
more than $200,000 in individual income in each of the two previous years and who reason-
ably expects to earn at least that income in the current year; (f) a trust holding greater than
$5,000,000 in assets that was not formed for the purpose of acquiring securities; and (g) any
entity where all equity owners are accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 501(a).
6. 1933 Act § 4(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2)).
7. See SEC v. Ralston-Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
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exemption specifically conditioned the availability of the exemption on
the absence of any general advertising or general solicitation. 8 Indeed,
the use of any form of general solicitation in connection with a private
placement of securities would violate Section 5 of the 1933 Act's registra-
tion requirement.9 Congress in the JOBS Act unraveled the 1933 Act's
legislative construct by amending the statute to add Section 4(b),10 pro-
viding that securities sold under Rule 506 (as revised pursuant to the
JOBS Act) "shall not be deemed public offerings under the federal secur-
ities laws as a result of general advertising or general solicitation.""l As
discussed above, Congress mandated the SEC adopt a Rule 506 exemp-
tion that would not be subject to the traditional ban on general solicita-
tion so long as the securities were sold only to verified accredited
investors.' 2 The SEC was understandably unenthusiastic but, neverthe-
less, followed its orders and bifurcated Rule 506 into two distinct exemp-
tions. 13 The SEC retained the traditional Rule 506 exemption as Rule
506(b), 14 under which general solicitation continues to be prohibited, and
created a new Rule 506(c), 15 under which general solicitation is permit-
ted.16 As directed by Congress, the SEC for the first time has allowed
companies relying on the Rule 506(c) exemption to offer their securities
to the general public, provided that they sell those securities only to inde-
pendently verified accredited investors.' 7
Passed with bipartisan support and with great fanfare, Title II of the
JOBS Act, originally titled, The Access to Capital for Jobs Creators
Act,' 8 was ostensibly designed to promote job creation by allowing small
businesses to raise capital by going directly to the general public. 19 Now,
under the new Rule 506(c) exemption, businesses of all sizes may market
their securities to the general population, whether through Super Bowl
ads, Facebook, television infomercials, websites, billboards, or any other
8. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (The issuer shall not "offer or sell the securities by any form
of general solicitation or general advertising, including... (1) [a]ny advertisement, article,
notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or
broadcast... ; and (2) [a]ny seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any
general solicitation or general advertising[.]"); see also Manning Gilbert Warren III, Re-
view of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM U. L. REV. 355, 376 (1984).
9. See 1933 Act § 5 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012)).
10. 1933 Act § 4(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(b) (2012)); see JOBS Act § 201(b)(2).
11. 1933 Act § 4(b).
12. See supra note 5. The SEC eliminated the prohibition against general solicitation,
provided that the issuer take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers are accredited in-
vestors. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 69959, 78 Fed. Reg.
44,771, 44,773 (July 10, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Final Rules].
13. Id.




18. Access to Capital for Jobs Creators Act, H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
19. See id.
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media, without registration or any other regulatory scrutiny by the SEC.
20
Because Congress has deemed all securities offered in reliance on (and in
compliance with) 21 Rule 506 to be "covered securities," 22 securities of-
fered under the new Rule 506(c) are similarly free from otherwise appli-
cable state registration requirements.2 3 The JOBS Act, as implemented,
simply extends Rule 506's preemptive effect from privately offered Rule
506(b) securities to publicly offered Rule 506(c) securities.
One might surmise that when the new Rule 506(c) became effective on
September 23, 2013, the floodgates would open. Small businesses, which
claimed that for decades their access to capital was regularly denied by
federal securities regulation, would bring all their pent-up demand for
capital to the general public. The general public would be besieged by
issuers ranging from legitimate enterprises to boiler rooms operating out
of cheap motels. In reality, the floodgates did not open. The vast majority
of issuers and their counsel have continued to rely on the traditional Rule
506(b) private offering exemption and have largely refrained from using
the Rule 506(c) public offering exemption.
In this article, I will address the false promise of this new regime ex-
empting publicly offered private placements from regulatory scrutiny. I
will first discuss a Form D survey that I conducted to measure the securi-
ties market's response to the Rule 506(c) opportunity. In this survey, I
reviewed Form D data generated since Rule 506(c)'s inception that re-
flects the comparable use of the Rule 506(b) and (c) exemptions. I will
then identify and discuss factors that may have contributed to issuers'
reluctance to rely on the Rule 506(c) exemption for their private offer-
ings, despite its amplification of the potential market for their securities. I
will also address the results of my recent survey of securities lawyers
whose practices involve assisting their issuer clients in conducting private
placements of securities. I undertook the survey primarily to measure the
relative significance of factors that may have limited usage of the new
exemption. I will conclude that while exempt securities offerings may one
day be commonly offered to the general public-perhaps through Ama-
20. The SEC, as a matter of practice, has not monitored Form D filings made with
respect to Rule 506 and other Regulation D offerings. The SEC's Office of Inspector Gen-
eral (OIG) reported that the SEC "does not generally take action when [it] learn[s] that
issuers have not complied with the requirements of the Regulation D exemptions." U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Off. Inspector Gen., Regulation D Exemption Process v (2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/459.pdf. The SEC "does not substantially
review the more than 20,000 Form D filings that it receives annually." Id. According to
Brian Lane, former Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, "the whole
idea of a private placement is that it doesn't get SEC review." Maria Lokshin, Capital
Formation, Split Clears JOBS Act Advertising Rule, Issues Proposal on Enhanced Require-
ments, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1285, 1286 (July 15, 2013).
21. The vast majority of courts have held that any issuer claiming a Rule 506 exemp-
tion for its securities offering must satisfy its burden of proof on its claim of exemption and
on the affirmative defense of preemption by establishing that it has, in fact, complied with
the conditions of the exemption. See, e.g., Brown v. Earthboard Sports, USA, Inc., 481 F.3d
901 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290 (Ala. 2005).
22. 1933 Act § 18(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2012)).
23. Id.
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zon.com-like platforms-that day is a long way off. For now, reluctance
factors ranging from traditional deal structures to regulatory uncertain-
ties will continue to suppress usage of the new rule. Despite its promise,
the advent of the publicly offered private placement exemption has not
yet reshaped the private placement landscape or provided greater access
to capital.
I. ANALYSIS OF FORM D FILINGS TO MEASURE THE
RESPONSE TO RULE 506(C)
A. ANALYSIS OF AMOUNT OF FORM D FILINGS
The effective date of Rule 506(c), September 23, 2013, marked the in-
augural opportunity for issuers to use the publicly offered private place-
ment exemption. Despite the novelty of the new exemption and its
promise of greater access to capital, issuers demonstrated a strong prefer-
ence for the traditional Rule 506(b) exemption. My survey of Form D
filings on Rule 506(c)'s birthday revealed that only seven out of sixty-five
Form D filings, or 10.77%, indicated reliance on Rule 506(c). Filings that
indicated reliance on Rule 506(b) constituted 73.84% of all Form D fil-
ings made on that day. From day one, it was apparent that issuers would
continue to rely primarily on the Rule 506(b) exemption. During the fol-
lowing eighteen months, the disparity has grown considerably sharper.
In my survey, I compared the first eighteen months of filings made by
issuers in reliance on Rule 506(b) and on Rule 506(c). In compiling data
from the SEC's historical archives, 24 I limited my search results to only
Form D filings made during the period September 23, 2013, through
March 31, 2015. I then separated that retrieved data by filings made in
reliance on each of Regulation D's four component exemptions, Rule
504,25 Rule 505,26 Rule 506(b)27 and Rule 506(c). 28 I then calculated the
number of filings made under each of those exemptions and arranged
that data into a chart to illustrate the frequency with which issuers have
claimed those respective exemptions.
The data reviewed demonstrates that the hype expressed when Rule
506(c) was promulgated, including suggestions that these publicly offered
private placements would replace initial public offerings in raising capi-
24. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Historical SEC EDGAR Archive,
available at http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar (last accessed March 12, 2015). This anal-
ysis is based on information collected from Form D filings submitted to the SEC. However,
as the SEC noted in its Adopting Release, this may not be "a complete view of the Rule
506 market, particularly with respect to the amount of capital raised." SEC Final Rules,
Exchange Act Release No. 69959 at 63 (July 10, 2013). Many commentators have noted
that while issuers "are required to file a Form D within 15 days of the first sale of securi-
ties," many issuers do not comply with these obligations. Id. at 64 & n.189; see also JOHN
COFFEE, JR., & HILLARY SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 374 (12th ed. 2012).
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tal,29 has thus far been a gross exaggeration. Rule 506(c) during its inau-
gural eighteen months has not significantly altered the way issuers raise
capital or the way they conduct their private offerings of securities. Dur-
ing that period issuers made 34,199 Form D filings. Of those filings,
32,166 or 94.6%, indicated issuer reliance on the Rule 506(b) or (c) ex-
emptions. Comparison of the two Rule 506 substantive exemptions re-
vealed that issuers relied on Rule 506(b) in 29,684 filings, or 92.28%, of
all Rule 506 filings, while issuers relied on Rule 506(c) in only 2,482 fil-
ings, or 7.71%, of all Rule 506 filings. Issuer reliance on the other Regula-
tion D exemptions was even less significant, with issuers indicating
reliance on Rule 504 in only 450 filings, or 1.32%, and on Rule 505 in
only 824 filings, or 2.42% of all Form D filings made during the eighteen
months following of Rule 506(c)'s effective date. The chart below illus-
trates the strong issuer preference during the subject period for the tradi-
tional Rule 506(b) exemption for private placements.
Figure 1
I also filtered the Form D data reviewed to compare the number of
unique issuer filings under each of the Regulation D substantive exemp-
tions. This was done to measure the actual number of issuers asserting
reliance on one of these exemptions without regard to the number of
29. Yin Wilczek, Advertised Private Offerings Will Surpass IPOs, Crowdfunded Securi-
ties, Lawyers Say, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1773, 1773 (Sept. 30, 2013).
Form D Filings 9/23/13 - 3/31/15
Rule 506(c) Rule 504









Form D filings made by those issuers. During the eighteen-month period,
25,851 unique issuers relied on the Rule 506(b) exemption, while 2,193
unique issuers relied on the Rule 506(c) exemption. This demonstrates
that only a small percentage of issuers are repeat players in the private
capital market.
B. CAPITAL RAISED THROUGH FORM D FILINGS
Next, I analyzed the amount of capital raised by issuers in reliance on
the Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c) exemptions in the first eighteen months
since the SEC promulgated Rule 506(c), from September 23, 2013,
through March 31, 2015. While Title II of the JOBS Act was premised on
the mysterious notion that its new generally solicited private offering
would significantly increase the size of private markets, my analysis of the
capital raised has returned results that dispute this premise.30 In the first
eighteen months, issuers sold over $880 billion in Regulation D securities
claiming the Rule 506(b) or 506(c) exemptions.
Looking further into the capital sold under Regulation D offerings, it is
evident that 506(c) offerings constitute only a small portion of the private
market. As shown in Table 1, infra, Rule 506(c) offerings made up 7.42%
of all Regulation D offerings from September 23, 2013 through March 31,
2015, but only represented 2.5% of the aggregate dollar amount sold
under Rule 506.31 Issuers sold over $22 billion in securities under Rule
506(c) in the first eighteen months, but Rule 506(b) offerings surpassed
the value of Rule 506(c) offerings 38 times over. The data revealed that
issuers sold over $858 billion under Rule 506(b) during that same pe-
riod.32 Accordingly, Rule 506(b) offerings constitute 88.77% of all Regu-
lation D offerings, but over 97% of the capital raised. The vast
discrepancies between the aggregate dollar amount of capital raised com-
pared to the number of Rules 506(b) and (c) offerings further evidence
that Rule 506(b) continues to dominate the private market.
30. In 506(c)'s first year, from September 23, 2013 through September 22, 2014, issuers
sold over $690 billion in all Regulation D securities, which was lower than the previous
three-year average. This suggests that the JOBS Act has not yet increased the size of the
private markets in the way Congress had anticipated. JOSEPH SULLIVAN, EQUITY
CROWDFUNDING UNDER TITLE II OF THE JOBS ACr: THE FIRST YEAR 4 (Offerboard
White Papers Oct. 2013).
31. Id. This study only measures the amount of capital that has been reported and
raised as of the date of filing. Any capital raised after filing, which may have been reported
on an amended filing, is not included. According to Sullivan, Rule 506(c) offerings also
"have the lowest percentage of funds committed at the time of the filing-15.9% compared
to 73.2% for 506(b) offerings." Id. at 5. This discrepancy in committed funds may result
because: (a) of the nature of general solicitation, (b) issuers register "earlier in the process
because they collect funds immediately, rather than waiting to collect funds once there is a
critical mass, as is often done in the 506(b) process[,]" or (c) 506(c) offerings generally have
a "lower minimum investment size." Id. It should be noted that the author's data points did
not add up to the correct totals, so while my study used the individual numbers for the
count of offerings sold, the amount offered, and the amount sold for each Regulation D
offering, my total values are different than what the author's data points reflect.
32. Id. at 4.
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Table 1
Number and Amount of Offerings Sold by Exemption
33
Capital Sold as
Number of % of Total Amount of % of Total
Offerings Offerings Capital Sold Rule 506
Rule 506(b) 29,684 88.77% $858,598,349,179 97.48%
Rule 506(c) 2,482 7.42% $ 22,219,096,239 2.52%
Total 32,166 $ 880,817,445,418
II. ANALYSIS OF RULE 506(C) RELUCTANCE FACTORS
My analysis of the Form D data obviously begs the question: Why are
issuers and their counsel so reluctant to fulfil Rule 506(c)'s promise? Af-
ter all, they have been positioned by the JOBS Act and the SEC's pro-
mulgation of Rule 506(c) to raise unlimited amounts of capital, with no
formal disclosure requirements and with no presale regulatory scrutiny,
by offering securities to billions of offerees to attract purchases from mil-
lions of accredited investors. Since the promulgation of Rule 506(c) on
July 10, 2013, I have made continual, informal inquiries to practicing se-
curities counsel to answer this perplexing question. The explanatory fac-
tors I have been provided may be briefly listed as follows:
(1) Issuers and their counsel attest to the availability of sufficient
capital to fund their offerings without resort to general solicitation.
34
(2) Issuers and their counsel have found the traditional Rule 506(b)
model to be highly practicable and reliable private placement struc-
ture and that familiarity provides for an understandable best prac-
tices inertia. 35
(3) Issuers and their counsel are profoundly reluctant to offer securi-
ties to accredited strangers, as opposed to investors with whom they
have preexisting personal and business relationships.
36
(4) Issuers and their counsel are uncomfortable with the regulatory
uncertainties presented by Rule 506(c)'s requirements that the ac-
credited investor status of their investors must be verified by third
33. This number may be slightly understated or overstated because companies are not
required to file an amended Form D unless the amount sold is greater than 10% of the
amount offered. The data is merely to establish an overview of capital sold under the
various exemptions.
34. See Preqin Ltd., JOBS Act - How Will Hedge Fund Managers Respond?, HEDGE
FUND SPOTLIGHT 6 (Apr. 2014) (some investors can access sufficient capital from their
established pool of investors), available at https:/lwww.preqin.com/docs/newsletters/hf/
PreqinHedge_- FundSpotlightApril_2014.pdf.
35. One attorney has noted that many issuers appear hesitant to engage in a Rule
506(c) offering due both to greater familiarity with Rule 506(b) and a misunderstanding of
Rule 506(c)'s requirements. Phillip R. Sanders, Understanding the New Rule 506(c) Exemp-
tion, 42 SEC. REG. L. J. 347, 368 (2014).
36. Karlee Weinmann, 5 Reasons Funds Won't Touch JOBS Act Marketing Rules,
LAw360 (Apr. 10, 2014), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/526895/5-reasons-
funds-won-t-touch-jobs-act-marketing-rules.
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parties, 37 as opposed to the traditional self-certifications accepted in
Rule 506(b) offerings. 38
(5) Issuers and their counsel are also fearful of their investors' pri-
vacy concerns regarding the required revelation of confidential fi-
nancial information, 39 particularly since most privately placed
investment opportunities, under Rule 506(b), do not require this
disclosure.40
(6) Issuers and their clients are concerned about the uncertainties
presented by the SEC's proposed amendments related to the Rule
506(c) exemption, including, among other things, the proposal that
marketing materials be filed with the SEC,41 that enhanced disclo-
sures be made in the Form D Notice of Sales,42 that Form D filings
must be made in advance of the first sale,43 and that failing to file a
Form D could disqualify issuers from future reliance on the
exemption. 44
(7) Issuers and their clients would prefer to avoid the more intense
regulatory scrutiny that the SEC has indicated it will direct toward
generally solicited private placements. 45
(8) Securities counsel have raised concerns over numerous potential
regulatory and civil liability issues, including the compliance risks
under foreign regulatory regimes with conflicting regulatory require-
ments and the risk that Rule 506(c) offerings may expose issuers to
37. John Filar Atwood, Verification Requirement is Driving Companies Away from
Rule 506(c) Offerings, SEC TODAY, 2014 WL 6630145 (Nov. 24, 2014); see also DEAL-
FLOW.COM, ONLINE DEAL MKTG. OUTLOOK FOR Q2 2014 13, (Dealflow White Paper
(Apr. 2014)), available at https://dealflow.com/whitepapers/DealflowWhitePaperQl_
2014.pdf.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2013); see also Atwood, supra note 37.
39. Sanders, supra note 35, at 366 (privacy concerns may be a strong deterrent to po-
tential purchasers in deciding whether to invest in a private offering).
40. Rule 506(b), as the exemption of choice for private placements of securities, only
requires that issuers "reasonably believe" the accredited investor status of their investors,
generally based on self-certification by those investors in investor questionnaires and sub-
scription agreements. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013) (defining "accredited investor" as any
person who comes within the stated categories or who the issuer reasonably believes comes
within any of those categories). Rule 506(b), unlike Rule 506(c), does not impose an inde-
pendent verification requirement. Consequently, investors, faced with numerous invest-
ment opportunities under Rule 506(b) that do not implicate privacy concerns, may be
unwilling to invest in Rule 506(c) investment opportunities that do. Moreover, the SEC has
noted that issuers should have their own regulatory concerns about collecting information
that may be subject to federal and state privacy and data security requirements. SEC Final
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 69959, at 15 n.118 (July 10, 2013).
41. Amendments to Regulation D, Form D, and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806, 44,815 (July 24, 2013) [herein-
after SEC Proposed Rules].
42. Id. at 44,830.
43. Id. at 44,811.
44. Id. at 44,833; see Atwood, supra note 37. Annemarie Tierney, General Counsel,
SecondMarket Holdings, has stated that the "overhang" of the proposed Regulation D
amendments have made Rule 506(c) unattractive. Id.
45. Weinmann, supra note 36.
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strict liability under Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.
46
While these factors are hardly exhaustive, they do suggest a profound
reluctance on the part of issuers and their counsel to wander an un-
charted course.
To explore the reluctance of securities counsel to advise their issuer
clients' reliance on the Rule 506(c) exemption, I developed a brief survey
of attorneys in the United States who specialize in private placements of
securities. In this survey I asked these securities lawyers to respond to
three basic questions. The first asked if the attorney had advised any cli-
ent issuer to claim reliance on the Rule 506(b) exemption for any private
placement offering since the inception of Rule 506(c). The second asked
whether the attorney had advised any client issuer to claim reliance on
the Rule 506(c) exemption since its inception. The final question asked
the attorney to select from a brief list the factors that underlie any prefer-
ence for Rule 506(b) over Rule 506(c). The factors were presented as
follows:
1. Availability of adequate capital from accredited investors without
resort to general solicitation.
2. Satisfaction with the existing Rule 506(b) standards.
3. Uncertainties presented by the Rule 506(c) verification
requirement.
4. Investor reluctance to disclose confidential financial information
to issuer clients.
5. Client reluctance to offer securities to accredited strangers versus
investors with whom the attorney or issuer has a preexisting
relationship.
6. Uncertainties presented by the SEC's proposed amendments re-
lated to the Rule 506(c) exemption, including the proposed re-
quirement that the issuer file marketing material with the SEC.
7. Other.
I distributed this survey to private placement attorneys across the
country. In response to the first question, 90% of the respondent attor-
neys affirmed that they had utilized the Rule 506(b) exemption on their
clients' behalf in the previous eighteen months. Curiously, approximately
25% in response to the second question, indicated they had utilized the
Rule 506(c) exemption during the same period, significantly greater than
the 7.71% of Regulation D offerings indicated by the Form D survey. Of
course, the ratio of Rule 506(c) Form D filings measured a definitive ratio
based on specific data not influenced by other external factors. In addi-
tion, the attorney response rate was approximately 14%, while the Rule
46. Although the Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995), held
that the express civil remedy provided at § 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act did not apply to pri-
vate placements conducted pursuant to § 4(a)(2), it is far from clear that the Court's ratio-
nale would extend to Rule 506(c)'s publicly offered private placement exemption. Shortly
after the SEC promulgated Rule 506(c), one prominent securities lawyer conceded that the
courts might ultimately conclude that Gustafson does not apply to Rule 506(c) offerings.
See Wilczek, supra note 29.
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506(c) to Rule 506(b) ratio of Form D filings was based on all documents
filed during the subject period.
The attorneys' responses to the third question confirmed the relevancy
of the various factors that have resulted in a practical resistance to the
temptations of Rule 506(c). Approximately 80% of respondents affirmed
that their issuer clients had access to adequate capital from accredited
investors without any resort to general solicitation. Some 70% of respon-
dents expressed satisfaction with the preexisting Rule 506(b) regulatory
requirements in conducting private placements, following a variant of "if
it isn't broken, don't fix it." They indicated that they would continue to
advise their issuer clients to use the Rule 506(b) exemption because they
were both experienced in and satisfied with this regulatory model.
The reluctance factors related to the new Rule 506(c) accredited inves-
tor verification requirements and their investor privacy implications were
viewed by securities lawyers as obstacles to the utilization of the new ex-
emption. Under Rule 506(b), issuers and their counsel have long relied
on investor self-certification47 as satisfying the rule's "reasonable belief"
standard.48 The new Rule 506(c) retains the reasonable belief standard
but also independently requires the issuer to take reasonable steps to ver-
ify accredited investor status. 49 Approximately 65% of respondents indi-
cated concerns over compliance with the verification requirement. The
SEC, in its adopting release, refused to prescribe uniform verification
methods for issuers. 50 The resultant uncertainties would relate, of course,
to the SEC's provision of verification methodology options, ranging from
a rather vague principles-based approach51 to four specific, non-exclusive
methods of verifying accredited investor status for natural persons. 52 In
addition, issuers and their counsel must also monitor accredited investor
verification outcomes for staleness issues under the SEC's three-month
staleness standard. 53 With regard to the privacy implications of the new
verification requirement, 45% of respondents to the attorney survey indi-
47. See SEC Final Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 69959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, at
44,782; Bruce Davis, Public Advertising of Private Investment Offerings: The Operation and
Issues in Post-JOBS Act Regulation D, 13 U.C. DAVIs Bus. L.J. 295, 303 & n.18 (2013); see
also Letter from Michael Flannigan, Executive Vice-President, BrokerBank Securities,
Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n (July 10, 2012), available at https://
www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-43.pdf (claiming that self-certification has
been "followed by the industry for decades").
48. Davis, supra note 47.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2013). The SEC emphasized that the verification require-
ment is an independent requirement of the Rule 506(c) exemption and "must be satisfied
even if all purchasers happen to be accredited investors." SEC Compliance and Disclosure
Interpretations, Question 260.07 (last accessed June 19, 2015), available at http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm.
50. See SEC Final Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 69959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, at
44,780 (July 10, 2013).
51. Id. at 44,800.
52. Id. at 44,780.
53. Id. at 44,781. The SEC has indicated that the relevant documentation relied upon
under its specific verification methods must be dated within the prior three months of the
sale of securities. SEC Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, Question 260.08 (Nov.
13, 2013).
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cated their fears of investor reluctance to disclose their confidential finan-
cial information to either issuers or third parties as part of the verification
process. This disclosure burden may, in turn, chill investor interest in
Rule 506(c) offerings since, as previously discussed, approximately 90%
of private placements are conducted in reliance on Rule 506(b) which
completely avoids this burden by permitting accredited investors to self-
certify their accredited investor status.
The respondents also expressed significant concerns regarding the ex-
tension of their client issuers' private offerings to the universe of accred-
ited investors. Some 30% of respondents indicated their reluctance to
offer their clients' securities to accredited strangers. As stated previously,
80% of respondents affirmed that their client issuers had access to ade-
quate capital from accredited investors with whom they already had pre-
existing business relationships, and, accordingly, did not recognize the
need for general solicitation. These respondents' concerns certainly ac-
cord with my own observations that "most securities lawyers believe it is
not beneficial to their clients' interests to recruit anonymous accredited
investors,"'54 reflecting their tendency "to be very cautious about inves-
tors who may have the money but have little experience in making money
and losing money in private equity deals. '55
Finally, approximately 25% of the respondents expressed their prefer-
ence for the Rule 506(b) exemption because of the uncertainties sur-
rounding Rule 506(c), given its relatively recent adoption, and, of course,
the uncertainties presented by the regulatory overhang of amendments
related to Rule 506(c) that were proposed by the SEC at the time of its
adoption.56 These proposed amendments have been languishing now for
almost two years, and the SEC has not provided any definitive timeline
for their adoption.57 Securities attorneys are understandably reluctant to
54. Warren, Role of the States, supra note 3, at 1004.
55. Id.
56. SEC Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806, at
44,814 (July 24, 2013). The SEC proposed the requirement that issuers include specific
information on their Form D regarding the "types of general solicitation used[,]" and to
add a new Rule 509, which would require investors to include "legends in any written
general solicitation materials used in a Rule 506(c) offering" and include even more disclo-
sures for "private funds if such materials include performance data." Id. The SEC pro-
posed additional amendments including: (1) amending Rule 503 to require issues to file an
"Advance Form D" before engaging in general solicitation, and then requiring them to file
an amendment in which they must provide the remaining information required by Form D
within 15 calendar days after the first sale of securities, id. at 44,812; (2) amending Rule 503
to require the issuers to file a "final amendment to Form D within 30 calendar days after
the termination of any offering conducted in reliance on Rule 506[,]" id.; (c) revising Form
D to require issuers to include specific information regarding the methods the issuers used
to verify the status of the accredited investors, id. at 44,814; (d) amending Rule 507 to
include the automatic disqualification of issuers from using Rule 506 in any subsequent
new offering for one year if the issuer, or any predecessor of the issuer, "did not comply,
within the past five years, with Form D filing requirements in a Rule 506 offering[,]" id. at
44,817.
57. SEC Chair Mary Jo White, in a March 21, 2014 address, stated that finalization of
the proposed rules to monitor the new general solicitation regime would be her "top prior-
ity" for 2014. See Wilczek, supra note 29; see also Rob Tricchinelli, Investors and Investing,
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modify their clients' financing strategies by resorting to generally solicited
Rule 506(c) offerings shadowed by SEC threats to superimpose burden-
some additional disclosure requirements and other regulations. 58 The
chart below illustrates the attorney responses to the reluctance factors set
forth in the survey.
Figure 2
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My survey of practicing securities lawyers demonstrates their general
reluctance to advise reliance by their client issuers on the new Rule
506(c) exemption for publicly offered private placements of securities.
The survey questions were quite basic and, perhaps, should have ad-
dressed other reluctance factors as well. The survey did not address, for
example, strong issuer preferences for the confidentiality of their private
offerings. Issuers would understandably prefer, if not insist, that their
confidential business plans-including their need for private capital and
their proposed use of that capital-not be disclosed to the public at large,
and particularly, their competitors. In addition, public disclosure of their
offerings through general solicitation may well place them in the regula-
tory spotlight of both state and federal regulatory agencies. The North
American Securities Administration Association (NASAA) and its mem-
ber state regulatory agencies have strongly expressed their antipathy to
the Rule 506(c) regime.59 The SEC has repeatedly expressed its policy of
Levin, Other Dems Want Investor Protection in General Solicitations of Private Offerings,
46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1872 (Sep. 29, 2014).
58. See generally SEC Proposed Rules at 44,806.
59. Letter from Jack Herstein, President, N. Am. Sec. Administrators Ass'n, to Eliza-
beth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n 4 (July 3, 2012), available at http://
www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07Ilnitial-NASAA-Comments-to-SEC-re-JOBS-
Act-Rulemaking.pdf; see also Jack Herstein, Election-year Politics Trump Investor Protec-
tion, THE HILL (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:52 PM), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/
politics/216339-election-year-politics-trump-investor-protection.
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special vigilance in monitoring its use by issuers.60 Issuers are unlikely to
be enthusiastic about becoming the lone buck in a treeless meadow.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress, through Title II of the JOBS Act, forced the SEC to adopt a
Rule 506 exemption from registration for securities offerings advertised
to the entire universe of offerees. Despite the fierce resistance of state
regulators and investor protection advocates, 61 Congress thought it was a
good idea for the promotion of greater access to capital for our nation's
small and large businesses alike. In the eighteen month period since the
SEC reluctantly adopted the new Rule 506(c) exemption for publicly of-
fered private placements, only a relative paucity of issuers have taken
advantage of Congress's beneficence.
In this article, I have addressed the false promise of Rule 506(c). My
survey of Form D data for that eighteen-month period leads to the ines-
capable conclusion that Rule 506(c) has not yet received the anticipated
robust reception in the securities marketplace. Instead, the traditional
Rule 506(b) exemption for offerings that are not generally solicited re-
mains the predominant exemption of choice for an overwhelming major-
ity of private placement issuers. After my review of the Form D data, I
then explored the numerous reluctance factors that might explain Rule
506(c)'s lukewarm reception. I then discussed my survey of securities law-
yers whose practices include representation of private placement issuers.
The vast majority of these attorneys have thus far found Rule 506(c) to be
of fairly limited utility to their clients. Based on my review of the Form D
data and the responses from active securities counsel, I have concluded
that for bona fide issuers, represented by competent securities counsel,
the Rule 506(b) exemption for private placements provides the most sat-
isfactory exemption from registration. While Rule 506(c) might be hailed
as the ultimate platform for accredited investor crowdfunding, it has yet
to achieve its promise.
60. See SEC Proposed Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806,
at 44,814 (July 24, 2013).
61. See Letter from Michael Flannigan, Executive Vice President, BrokerBank Securi-
ties, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n (July 10, 2012), available at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/obs-title-ii/jobstitleii-43.pdf.
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